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Abstract 
This paper constructs a duopoly game model and investigates its stability with bounded rationality strategy and state 
delay. Numerical experiments are also carried out to exhibit its dynamical features such as bifurcation diagram, 
maximal Lyapunov exponent curve, strange attractor and so on. The results show that state delay can enlarge the 
local stability region of Nash equilibrium point and delay the outputs bifurcation. The faster adjustment speed will 
induce more complex dynamical response of outputs such as cycles and chaos. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the problem of oligopoly game has been extensively investigated [1-11]. These 
literatures show that even for the simplest case of duopoly game，the dynamics are extremely complex 
because one player’s profit depends not only on its own quantity decision but also on its rival’s reaction. 
The existing literatures on duopoly game were usually carried out by classical Cournot assumption and 
three decision-making methods or their combinations: naive method [1-3], adaptive method [4-5] and 
bounded rationality method [6-11]. In fact, expectation factors play an important role in the progress of 
duopoly game. Different expectation methods will have great effect on the dynamics of duopoly game. 
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For instance, Kamalinejad et al [12] investigated the duopoly game with linear regression expectation. 
Elsadnay [11] studied the dynamics of a duopoly game with constant marginal cost by introducing the 
state-delay to estimate the rival’s following quantity. However, the marginal cost will never remain static 
along with the quantity increasing. Also, the information in the market is usually incomplete. Therefore in 
this paper, we study the dynamics of a duopoly game by using bounded rationality strategy, introducing 
state delay to estimate the rival’s expectation quantity, and considering the increasing marginal costs. 
2. Delayed duopoly game model 
Consider two Firms in the market producing same or homogeneous goods. The inverse demand 
function is assumed linear and decreasing: P a bQ= − , where 1 2Q q q= +  is the total output and , 0a b > .
The marginal cost of two Firms is assumed as increasing, i.e., the cost function is of the following form: 
2( )i i i i i i iC q c d q e q= + + , 1,2i = , where , , 0i i ic d e > . In many existing literatures [6-10], depending on the 
marginal profit in time period t , the player with bounded rationality adjusts its output in time period 1t +
to maximize its profit. In fact, the maximal profit of Firm i in time period 1t +  is relevant to the quantity 
decision of Firm j  in time period 1t + , so we introduce the production expectation ( 1)eq t + into the 
usual bounded rationality model as below [11]: 
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where 1v  and 2v  are positive and represent the relative speed of adjustment. ( 1)
e
jq t + , 1, 2j = , denotes 
the expectation of Firm i  about the production decision of Firm j . Different from the usual Cournot 
assumption, the expectation of Firm i  about the production decision of Firm j in this paper is expressed 
by employing state delay, i.e.,  
( 1) ( ) (1 ) ( 1), 1,2ej j j j jq t w q t w q t j+ = ⋅ + − ⋅ − = ,                                                (2) 
where jw  is the weight and satisfies 0 1jw< < . By using (1) and (2)，the duopoly game with state delay 
and bounded rationality can be modeled as following: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
( 1) ( ) ( ) [ 2 ( ) ( ) [ ( ) (1 ) ( 1)]]
( 1) ( ) ( ) [ 2( ) ( ) [ ( ) (1 ) ( 1)]]
q t q t v q t a d b e q t b w q t w q t
q t q t v q t a d b e q t b w q t w q t
+ = + ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ −⎧⎨
+ = + ⋅ ⋅ − − + ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ −⎩
.      (3) 
Equations (3) has only one Nash equilibrium point * * *1 2( , )E q q= , where 
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. Based on the economic meaning， the parameters must satisfy the 
following conditions: 
1a d> , 2a d> , 2 12 0a d d+ − > , 1 22 0a d d+ − > .                                                (4) 
Proposition 1. The Nash equilibrium point *E   is locally stable. 
Equations (3) include state delay which makes it difficult to analyze the stability of (3). In order to 
study the stability of Nash equilibrium point *E , we rewrite (3) as a four-dimensional system in the form: 
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Obviously, * * * *1 2 1 2( , , , )E q q q q=  is the Nash equilibrium of (5) which has the same stability as Nash 
equilibrium point *E  of (3). The Jacobian matrix of (5) at Nash equilibrium point * * * *1 2 1 2( , , , )E q q q q=
takes the form: 
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where  * * * *1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 11 [ 2( ) ] 2 ( )A v a d b e q bq v b e q= + − − + − − +  and 
* * * *
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 21 [ 2( ) ] 2 ( )A v a d b e q bq v b e q= + − − + − − + .
The characteristic equation of (6) is  
4 3 2
1 2 3 4( ) 0P a a a aλ λ λ λ λ= + + + + = ,
where * *1 2 1a A A= − − ,
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4 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2a v v b q q v v w b q q v v w b q q v v w w b q q= − + + − . From the well-known Jury criteria [11 
and the literatures therein], the Nash equilibrium point * * * *1 2 1 2( , , , )E q q q q=  of (5) is stable if and only if 
the following conditions are satisfied: 
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This means that Nash equilibrium points *E  and E  are all stable if parameters meet the inequalities (7). 
In other words, the Nash equilibrium point *E   is locally stable. 
3. Numerical simulations 
To give the local stability region of Nash equilibrium point and study the dynamics of (3), it is 
convenient to take the parameters as follows: a 20= , b 0.5= , 1c 2= , 1d 0.6= , 1e 0.8= , 2c 2= , 2d 0.6= ,
2e 1= . The local stability region of Nash equilibrium point of (3) has been shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 for 
two different weights respectively. Comparing Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, one can see that the two local stability 
regions have similar shape but the region for the delay case ( 1 2 0.8w w= = ) is larger than that for the 
non-delay case ( 1 2 1w w= = ). Figs. 3 and 4 show the bifurcation diagrams of 1q  and 2q  with respect to 
1v  in two cases: non-delay and delay. It is easy to see from Figs. 3 and 4 that compared with the non-
delay case (see Fig. 3), the period-doubling bifurcations are delayed in the delay case (see Fig. 4). Fig. 5 
shows that Firm 1 can gain higher profit than Firm 2 when the outputs are of Nash equilibrium; while  the 
profit of Firm 1 will decrease and Firm 2 is  quite the opposite when the outputs bifurcation phenomenon 
and chaos appear. The positive maximal Lyapunov exponent can be used to identify chaos. Fig. 6 depicts 
the maximal Lyapunov exponent curve which is in accordance with Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 1. Local stability region of Nash equilibrium point on 
1 2( , )v v  plane with 1 2 1w w= =
Fig. 2. Local stability region of Nash equilibrium point on 
1 2( , )v v  plane with 1 2 0.8w w= =
Fig. 3. Bifurcation diagram of outputs 1 2,q q  vs. adjustment 
speed 1v   ( 1 2 1w w= = , 2 0.05v = )
Fig. 4. Bifurcation diagram of outputs 1 2,q q vs. adjustment 
speed 1v  ( 1 2 0.8w w= = , 2 0.05v = )
Fig. 5. Profit curves vs. adjustment speed 1v  ( 1 2 0.8w w= = ,
2 0.05v = )
Fig. 6. Maximal Lyapunov exponent vs. adjustment speed 1v
( 1 2 0.8w w= = , 2 0.05v = )
Fig. 7. Strange attractor of (4) in the delay case ( 1 0.158v = ,
2 0.05v = , 1 2 0.8w w= = )
Fig. 8. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions ( 1 0.158v = ,
2 0.05v = , 1 2 0.8w w= = )
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The strange attractor in Fig. 7 exhibits the specific fractal structure which means chaos’ appearance. 
According to Fig. 8, at the beginning, the two orbits starting from 1 2( (0), (0)) (5,5)q q =  and 
1 2( (0), (0)) (5.01,5)q q =  respectively are indistinguishable; but after about 10 times iteration, the 
difference between them builds up rapidly. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have formulated the delayed duopoly game model and investigated its dynamics. The 
stability of Nash equilibrium point was analyzed by using Jury criteria. The bifurcation diagram, maximal 
Lyapunov exponent curve, strange attractor, etc., were also used to exhibit the dynamical features of the 
model. The results show that state delay can enlarge the local stability region of Nash equilibrium point 
and delays the outputs bifurcation. For the firm with lower increasing speed of marginal cost, unstable 
outputs will induce its profit decreasing. However, the firm having higher increasing speed of marginal 
cost can gain more profit in the unstable or chaotic output market. The faster adjustment speed may cause 
more complex dynamical response of outputs such as cycles and chaos, which have been confirmed by the 
above numerical simulations. 
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